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The advent of mult i -programming and the proliferation of
shared computer systems has increased the need for greater
computer security. Computer security can be segmented into
six categories: physical, hardware, software, personnel,
communications and procedures. Embedded into software
security are those features which protect the system against
both unauthorized access and denial of service to authorized
users. Another term for this is access control. Access
control mechanisms verify an individual's identity via three
distinct methods: 1) something an individual knows, 2)
something an individual possesses or 3) something about the
individual. One device which keys on something about the
individual is a retinal scan system. This system utilizes
the retinal blood vessel pattern as a unique identifier.
This thesis studies one such retinal pattern recognition
device. For the purposes of this study, an experiment was
designed and conducted which determined the reliability of
this system as a function of various tolerance levels, as
well as its applicability as a computer systems access
control mechanism. The Eye Dentify 7.5 system by Eye
Dentify Inc., of Portland, Oregon, proved to be a fairly
expensive, highly reliable access control device. Its prob-
ability for false recognitions is far better than most other
known devices. It can be used as a physical access device
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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of multiprogramming, database management
systems and distributed computer systems has given rise to
the belief that data and computers are "shared resources".
As more and more systems are utilized by an ever increasing
range of the population, the need for security becomes
paramount
.
The first conference on computer security in 1967
segmented computer security into six categories: physical,
hardware, software, personnel, communications and
procedures. Physical security provides safeguards for the
system itself against such things as fire, flood, and
earthquakes. Hardware security protects all items dealing
with computer hardware including terminals, disks, tapes,
circuitry etc. Software security deals with the protection
mechanisms supporting both systems and applications
programs. Personnel security ensures that all personnel are
properly cleared and trained as to their role in the use of
computers. Communications security addresses the issues
reguarding the transmission safeguards of the system.
Procedures also need to be established in order to
administer the safeguards in all these areas.
Embedded into software security are those features which
will protect the system against unauthorized access or
modification to sensitive information as well as against
denial of service to authorized users. Another term for
this is access control. Department of Defense (DOD) policy
emphasizes access control as the most significant
application of computer security (Fauer, 1984).
Access control involves both identifying an individual
as an authorized user and verifying his/her identity before
allowing access. Verification of identification can be made
using one or more of three distinct methods: l)something an
individual knows, such as passwords; 2) something an
individual possesses, such as a badge or card; 3) something
about. the individual, such as fingerprints.
In recent years, emphasis has been placed on developing
an access device which verifies an individual's identity
based upon some kind of personal attribute. These devices
key on some particular feature that cannot be lost, stolen
or duplicated that distinguishes one individual from
another. Examples include such systems as those that
compare fingerprints, voice patterns and retinal patterns.
Retinal pattern recognition systems utilize the retinal
blood vessel pattern as a unique identifier. The
orientation/ location of the blood vessels in the back of the
eye form a pattern which has proven to be substantially
different from individual to individual. Systems keying on
this personal attribute take the retinal pattern and store
it in memory for use as a reference. When an individual
requests access, his/her retinal pattern is compared with
that in memory. If the two blood vessel patterns match
within a certain tolerance, admission is granted. Otherwise
access is denied.
The Eye Dentify 7.5 System by Eye Dentify, Inc. is one
such device. It is also the basis of this thesis. For the
purposes of this study, an experiment was designed and
conducted which determined the reliability of this system as
a function of various thresholds, as well as its
applicability as a computer system access control mechanism.
II. SECURITY BACKGROUND
A. GENERAL HISTORY
First generation computers had no real need for
security. Computers at that time were only capable of
operating with one user at a time. The programmer himself
was the operator. When he wanted to use the computer he
went into a room filled with vacuum tubes and circuits,
loaded his program into memory and waited for his program to
complete. He then took his program and the results and went
away. Because only one user program resided in memory at a
time and executed until completion, no protection mechanisms
were necessary.
Second generation computers saw the separation of
operator and programmer and the introduction of the resident
monitor. The resident monitor was a system program which
automatically transferred control from one user program to
another (Peterson, Silberschat z , 1984). Meanwhile, as in
the first generation, only one user program resided in
memory at a time and executed until completion. The only
protection that was necessary was the need to separate the
resident monitor from the user program.
Then in 1964 when IBM first marketed its 360 computer,
third generation computers were born. Solid state circuitry
and memories that could reach and exceed 128K words made it
possible for computers to become general purpose machines.
One machine could perform both numerical computation and
information processing. Third generation technology also
included the introduction of independent input/output (I/O)
processors that were capable of operating in parallel with
the central processor (CPU), hence the beginning of
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multiprogramming (Tangney , 1980) . Computers were now a
"shared resource". The demand for computer usage soared.
In the military environment, security was not a new
concept. Sensitive information that had previously been
stored and processed manually was and is assigned different
classifications, depending upon the damage which can occur
to national security if such information were disclosed.
Classifications can range from top secret and higher,
exposure of which can cause grave damage, to confidential
material which, if exposed, can cause some damage. At each
agency provisions are required which would authorize access
to such information only to those individuals with clearance
at the proper level and the "need to know" . Many of the
applications being considered for implementation in a
computer with multiprogramming needed to be processed
concurrently and at these multiple classification levels.
In order to satisfy these requirements the operating
system had to be able to effectively separate multilevel
information and thwart attempts by malicious users to gain
access to information for which they did not possess
sufficient clearance. Third generation operating systems
proved too unreliable to effectively protect information for
the simple reason that they were not constructed with
security in mind (ibid). This need was first addressed in
the fourth generation of computers
.
For fourth generation computers and currently in the
fifth generation, security is primarily based on the use of
formal mathematical models. The model most commonly used is
referred to as the Bell and Lapadula Model.
The Bell and Lapadula Model involves two principle
rules. The simple security solution specifies that a user
at a certain security level can have read access only to
objects at the same or lower security level. The "-property
(pronounced "star property") principle stipulates that a
11
user may modify only those objects which are at the same or
higher security levels.
The most prominent methodology based on this
mathematical model is the security kernal. Through this
model, the kernal implements a reference monitor, that is,
uses a system component that checks each reference by
subject to an object and determines the validity of the
access (Landwehr, 1983).
One of the first groups to study computer security in
detail was the Defense Science Board's Task Force on
Computer Security, organized by the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (now the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency or DARPA) . Formed in 1967, they developed
recommendations for appropriate computer security safeguards
that would protect classified information in multi-access,
resource sharing computer systems (Ware, 1979). The task
force concluded that
a combination of hardware, software, communication,
physical, personnel and administrative procedural
safeguards is required for comprehensive security and intgua
particular. software safeguards alone are
sufficient (National Bureau of Standards (NBS ) , 1979).
The Department of Defense was the first to promulgate
computer security policy in 1972 when it issued DOD
Directive 5200.28, "Security Requirements for Automatic Data
Processing (ADP) Systems". A follow-up document, DOD
5200. 28-M is known as the ADP Security Manual. In it
techniques and procedures are outlined for control in the
following areas:
1. Physical - safeguards for the system itself and
access to it. Types of measures include vaults,
locked doors and armed guards. Other physical
security issues include safeguards for





- control of documentation.
2. Personnel - all personnel must be properly cleared
and trained for their responsibilities in handling
classified information in computers.
3. Communications - addresses the passive monitoring of
electromagnetic emanations and the active
wire-tapping of information during transmission.
4. Procedural - establishes a system security officer
who coordinates the administration of all applicable
safeguards
.
5. Software - any security and protection mechanisms
supported by the operating system or by any








More recently the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
established the minimum requirements for a Federal computer
security program when it promulgated OMB Circular A-71.
These requirements affect all Federal departments and
agencies and include the
"establishment of physical, administrative and technical
safeguards required to adequately protect personal,
proprietary and other sensitive data not subject to
national security regulations" (Epperly , 1980, p. 14).
In addition, in 1978, Transmittal Memorandum 1 of OMB
Circular A-71 designated to NBS responsibility for
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developing computer security standards and guidelines.
These have been published through the Federal Information







- applications program development
- personal identification.
B. ACCESS CONTROL
In general, information in a computer system needs to be
protected in three ways (Landwehr, 1981):
1. against unauthorized access to sensitive information
2. against unauthorized modification
3. against denial of service to authorized users.
DOD approaches these issues in the requirements
specified in Part II of the DOD Trusted Computer Systems
Evaluation Criteria, entitled "Control Objectives for
Accountability" (DOD Computer Security Center, 1984). The
control objectives specify the following:
1. individuals must provide identification to the system
before being allowed interaction with the system
2. this identification must be authenticated by the
system
3. actions taken in the system must be traceable to
individuals who have been positively identified and
whose identity has been authenticated.
DOD has further stated that the most significant
computer security threat and therefore the control measures
that are most urgently needed are those that prevent
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unauthorized access (Fauer, 1984). In other words, the
central issue in developing a secure computer system is one
of access control.
The best way to ensure proper access control is to
establish a positive, unique identification for each person
or entity who is to be granted access. This should involve
a two-stage process (Hoffman, 1977):
1. identification - the individual presents some form of
identity such as "user name"
2. verification or authentication - privately held
information is presented to verify the claimed
identity
.
The unique identifier or "user name" is generally public
information and is unlikely to change. There are three ways
in which an individual's identity is verified (James, 1973):
1. something known to the individual - he could memorize
a password, secret number, or answer a prearranged
set of questions
.
2. something possessed by the individual - for example,
a badge, card or key.
3. something about the individual - this involves some
physical personal characteristic such as fingerprints
or voice prints.
1. Something an Individual Knows
Passwords are the most commonly used means of
controlling access to computer systems. They are the least
expensive and require no special hardware. The biggest
disadvantage is this information may become known to an
unauthorized user who can then use it as readily as an
authorized user. Passwords are assigned to the individual
in two general ways. In the first way the user is able to
generate his own password. The tendency here is to use
familiar words such as family name, locations and addresses.
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While these are, in most cases, easy to remember, they may
also be more easily discovered by a would-be perpetrator.
The second method allows the operating system to generate
passwords in a highly randomized fashion. While these do
not suffer the same threat of exposure of user generated
passwords, they are usually very difficult to remember. As
a result, the user will not commit it to memory; rather, he
will carry the password in written form which could be lost
or stolen.
2. Something the Individual Possesses
Another means of verification is through possession
of a token such as a key or machine- readable card. A token
may be used for providing the claimed identity or the user
may enter a claimed identity by means of a keyboard or
numerical keypad and then use the token to verify the
claimed identity (FIPS Pub 83, 1980). The disadvantage here
is that a token may be lost or stolen and a penetrater who
succeeds in obtaining a token can use it as readily as an
authorized user. Inclusion of some type of password scheme
may reduce the risk, but the risk involved with the use of
passwords must again be considered.
3
.
Something About the Individual
The ideal solution would be to develop a machine
that would always allow an authorized user access, but would
also verify identification via some means that can be
neither lost, stolen nor duplicated by an imposter. Because
of these inherent drawbacks in both passwords and keys or
cards, a great deal of research has focused on the
possibility of using some form of personal attribute with
which to verify an individual's identity (FIPS Pub 83,
1980). These personal attributes or biometric measurements
key on some particular form of interpersonal variation which
distinguishes one person from another.
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Devices already developed which verify identity
based on personal attributes generally operate in the
following manner:
1. The user enters his/her claimed identity.
2. The device records a series of measurements on the
personal attribute.
3. The measured profile is compared with the reference
profile (located either in a central location or on
some kind of magnetic strip on a card).
4. The resulting value is compared with a preset
toleration threshold which results in a binary
decision to accept or reject the individual (or to
request more data)
.
One of the chief limitations in using biometric
recognition for verification is the difficulty in performing
precise, repeatable measurements on the human body. Because
of the curvilinear nature of body surfaces and the
plasticity of body tissue, it is difficult to establish
accurate reference points as well -as good registration for
taking measurements or pattern matching (ibid).
There are two types of errors that biometric devices
can make
:
1. Type I errors : falsely rejecting a correct user.
This error rate is calculated by dividing the number
of false rejections by the total number of
verification attempts by authorized individuals.
2. Type II errors : falsely accepting an individual.
The type II error rate is calculated by dividing the
number of false acceptances by the number of
verification attempts.
Because of the imprecise nature of the attribute
being used, some type of tolerance must be built into the
device. However, the more tolerance allowed in order to




Other measures of effectiveness which need to be
considered when evaluating a biometric device include the
following (FIPS Pub 48, 1977):
1. Susceptibility to Circumvention - refers to the ease
with which the device might be circumvented
altogether without the need for deceiving the
recognition logic.
2. Time to Achieve Recognition - the time for biometric
sensing, file retrieval and time for correlation
processing to occur. User impatience with even
moderate inconveniences imposed can lead to attempts
to bypass the system by authorized users.
3. Convenience to the User - refers to ease of accepting
recognition as well as ease of learning to actuate
the recognition scheme.
4. Cost of the Recognition device - how much does the
recognition cost in terms of the cost of the
information it is to protect? The system should not
cost more than the worth of the information,
including the hardware and software designed to
create it.
5. Processing Required in the Computer System - how many
• functions of the biometric device require computer
programs, processing capacity and storage in a
central facility?
6. Reliability and Maintainability - how well will the
device perform over time and how fail-safe is it?
C. TYPES OF BIOMETRIC DEVICES
Several methods of identity verification based on
personal attributes have been developed and marketed. A few
examples are discussed below.
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1. Fingerprints
Verifying identity by manual fingerprint comparisons
has been used in forensic work for years. The uniqueness of
fingerprints for use as a personal attribute has been well
established.
Recently, equipment has been produced which obtains,
via a scanning device, an image of the fingerprint without
the use of ink and then compares this image, or details
extracted from it, with information in a reference file.
Comparisons can be made two ways. In the first, a direct
comparison is made between the "live" print and the file
print. The second method processes the signal image into a
digital pattern and matches these bytes with the data stored
in memory.
Tests conducted have exhibited a type I error rate
of 6.5 percent, a type II error rate of 2.3 percent (Fejfar,
1977). Unfortunately, fingerprints are highly deformable,






Hand geometry, or the shape of the hand has shown to
exhibit sufficient interpersonal variability to serve as a
basis for distinguishing one individual from another with an
acceptable degree of accuracy. The Equipment measures such
aspects as the length of the fingers from the rounding at
the end of the finger to the web between the fingers. Most
devices are constructed for use with a magnetic strip card
in which the reference profile is imbedded. However, the
device can also be connected to a central computer which
stores the reference data and does the comparison. The
major problems associated with hand geometry revolve around
the trans luscence of skin width of the hand. In addition,
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most devices do not account for the fact that fingernails
may be cut or grown to different lengths, thereby changing




Research in recent years has concluded that the
physical motions which occur during the writing of a
signature display variances between individuals with very
reasonable type I and type II errors. Signatures frequently
become so stylized and are done with little conscious
attention to formation as to make them difficult to mimic in
terms of the dynamic motions associated with them. Devices
using signature dynamics measure time varying force
information such as hand pressure and drag forces resulting
from the friction involved.
Lack of precise repeatability seems to be the major
drawback to signature dynamics. In a field test conducted
at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, this type of
equipment exhibited a type I error rate of 1.7 percent and a
type II error rate ranging from .02 percent for casual
imposters to .4 percent in deliberate forgery attempts.
4 Speech Verification
Speech may be viewed as being made up of a series of
transitions separated by regions of varying duration in
which the sounds are relatively steady (Weinstein, 1975).
The resulting harmonic structure is partly controllable and
partly inherent to the individual. For verification
purposes, devices quite often analyze the "steady" region.
The user establishes a reference pattern by repeating a
"training set" of selected utterances a number of times.
The utterances are digitized and stored in the software
system. The software system then segments the utterances,
i.e., places emphasis on phenomena that are similar among
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individuals. It then extracts those features which
distinguish an individual from another. When verification
is requested, it is those features which are compared.
Examples of such features include time intervals between
segmentation points, such as "v" and "b" in the utterance
"available". Another distinguishable feature measures the
pitch frequency between segmentation points (Dixon and
Martin, 1979).
Type I and type II error rates have shown to be 1.1
and 3.3 percent respectively (Foodman, 1977). The average
verification time is approximately 6.2 seconds. At present,
speech verification is so expensive as to be cost
prohibitive in the commercial marketplace.
5 . Retinal Pattern Recognition
Retinal pattern recognition systems utilize the
retina as a unique identifier (James , 1973; FIPS Pub 48,
1977, Pub 83, 1980). The blood vessels in the back of the
•eye form a pattern which has proven to be substantially
different from individual to individual. Systems keying on
this personal attribute take the retinal pattern and store
it in memory for use as a reference. When an individual
requests access, his/her retinal pattern is compared with
that in memory. If the two blood vessel patterns match
within a certain tolerance, admission is granted. Otherwise
access is denied.
Use of retinal patterns as a personal attribute for
verification purposes is the basis of this thesis. The
device tested in this experiment is the Eye Dentify 7.5
System by Eye Dentify Inc. of Portland, Oregon. Description




III. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT
A. EQUIPMENT USED
The Eye Dentify 7.5 system is a biometric recognition
access device utilizing the retinal pattern as the unique
identifier. The premise is derived from studies showing
with a high degreee of certainty that no two retinal
formations are identical (Simon and
Goldstein, 1935
,
pp. 901-906 ) . This was further supported by
Dr. Paul Tower(1955) whose study concluded that the greatest
dissimilarity between identical twins occured in the blood
vessel configuration of the retina.
In general, this system operates by storing reference
information of the retinal pattern in a microprocessor and,
upon entry demand, compares the stored information with the
pattern of the individual seeking access at that time. If
the stored information and that presented by the individual
agree within limits, admittance is allowed.
If the data does not compare well, access is denied.
There are essentially two ways in which entry demand
comparison takes place. The recognition mode requires no
input of claimed identity from the individual seeking
access. The live retinal pattern or "signature" is compared
with each reference pattern stored in memory. When the
verification mode is used, a personal identification number
(PIN) must be entered prior to the "live" signature. It is
then compared with that reference pattern in memory which is
associated with that particular PIN.
The hardware components contained in the system include
a binocular eyepiece, an electric camera, a microprocessor,
printed circuit boards and subassemblies, a cast aluminum
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housing with a 12-digit keypad, SCAN button, 8 character LED
display, and power supply. Internal software stores eye
signatures in memory, performs the matching process,
controls system operations and allows I/O through 2 RS-232
ports for terminal and computer or printer interface. A
system compatible display terminal is required to control
system functions and operations.
The eye camera (ICAM) illuminates a fovea- centered
circle on the back inside of the eye (including the retina
and choroid) with an infrared emitting diode (IRED). This
is the same infrared found in smoke detectors and television
remote controls. The scanning spot centralized by the ICAM
is 1.6 degrees in diameter and, as an external field half
angle, is 10 degrees. See Figure 3.1 for the illustration
of the scanning spot.
Figure 3.1 Scanning Spot, Extracted (Eye Dentify 7.5, 1984)
A total of 320 12-bit measurements are taken over a
range of 450 degrees using an infrared wavelength centered
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at 880 nanometers in the near-infrared region. Put simply,
the ICAM makes 1.25 revolutions of the scanner and uses an
infrared diode to illuminate and measure the light and dark
areas of the retina and choroid in the scan circle. The
resulting wavelength is then amplified, filtered, and
converted from an analog to a digital signal. Head
movements and slight variations in camera optics produce a
low frequency modulation which are removed by a proprietary
4-step algorithm. This signal is then packed into 40
bytes(320 bits) called a template or signature. These
templates are then either stored in memory or compared with
what is in memory. Through enrollment the templates are
stored in memory (IBANK) as reference templates. When access
is requested, the template is converted into a time domain
waveform. Subsequent live signatures from either the
recognition or verification mode of operation are processed
by a fourier cross correlation-based algorithm and matched
to a reference waveform with respect to their phase and RMS
amplitude. The two templates are then compared and a
correlation score, expressed as a proportion, is generated.
In addition, a software implemented phase corrector is used
to compensate for eye rotation about the visual axis.
The identification threshold is that score above which
the system decides there is sufficient correlation to assume
that the live signature matches the reference template and
below which the system decides there is a mismatch. When a
match occurs access is granted. While the 7.5 system
defaults to a threshold of .70 correlation, thresholds can
be lowered to .60 or raised to .85 as desired.
In 1984 the Oregon Museum of Science and Industry in
Portland, Oregon, conducted a study in which 2372 eye scans
were acquired and stored on disc (Eye Dentify 7.5, 1984).
383 reference templates were stored into 7.5 memory and
later transferred to a floppy disc. Each acquire was
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compared with each reference template and a frequency
distribution of correlation coefficients plotted. The
results indicate that the probability of a type II error was
1E-06 at the .70 threshold, 1E-05 prob. at the .65 and 1E-04
at the .58 threshold when the phase corrector was in
operation.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this experiment was to determine the
type I and type II error rate over a spectrum of correlation
thresholds. The thresholds utilized represented the low,
medium and high toleration levels allowed by the machine.
In addition, observations would be made regarding the other
measures of effectiveness so that conslusions could be drawn
as to the acceptability of the 7.5 system as a computer
security device. More specifically, it was anticipated that
recommendations could be made as to the suitability of this
system as a proper access control device in the military
environment. If this device could prove to be reliable in
terms of denying use to imposters while admitting authorized
users, it could be applied to numerous systems in the
military, especially in those areas where security is of
paramount concern. It was with these objectives in mind
that the experiment was conceived and completed.
C. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Twenty-six subjects participated on a volunteer
basis , twenty- four of which were military officers, both U.S.
and international, between the ages of 25 and 35 who were
assigned as students at the Naval Postgraduate School. None
of the subjects were color blind or had, in any way, some
form of opthomological disease for which they were under
medical treatment. There was a good cross- section of
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subjects whose vision was corrected through the use of
glasses, or hard or soft contact lenses. None of the
subjects were familiar with the 7.5 system in that they had
never used it under operational conditions.
A standard system-compatible RS-232 display terminal was
used to operate the menu driven internal software that
controls the system's operation.
Step one of the experiment required each subject to
enroll into the system. The enrollment process is the
procedure by which the retinal pattern is converted into a
template and stored in memory. This is the reference
template against which all other signatures are compared
when access is requested.
As each subject arrived to enroll, he was given the
following instructions to increase the probability of
building an accurate reference template:
1. Look into the binocular- type eyepiece
2. Fix your view on an object resembling a daisy wheel.
This view is seen through the right eye only. The
left eyepiece is for comfort only.
3. Shift your head until all or most of the red is
eliminated from the daisy.
4. When the daisy appears green or white concentrate on
the center of it and press the SCAN button located on
the face of the machine.
Depression of the SCAN button activates the ICAM
mechanism and a template is constructed. The enroller then
chose one of the following options:
1. allow the enrollee to repeat the process which
results in the construction of another template.
2. restart the process. When restart is activated only
the previous scan is retained. All other templates
not stored in memory are discarded with the previous
template becoming the reference.
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3. cancel the process. All templates not stored in
memory are discarded and the entire enrollment
process must be reinitiated.
4. finish the enrollment process.
Upon completion of a second SCAN or acquire, a numerical
score is displayed to the enroller. This score ranges from
-1.00 to +1.00 and represents the correlation between the
reference template and the subsequent acquire. The enroller
then chose to either accept or reject the latter signature.
If the signature was accepted it was averaged with the
reference template creating a new reference. A template
that was rejected was simply discarded with no change made
to the reference signature.
Each subject was guided through the same enrollment
process. The goal was to average four templates to the
reference to which each correlated with a score no lower
than +.90. This at times required over twenty scans by some
subjects. If scores were consistently below +.90, the
restart was initiated as it was concluded that the reference
template was poor. If, after restart, scores were still
consistently below +.90 the cancel option was used and the
enrollment process reinitiated. To Finish the enrollment, a
user identification name and personal identification number
(PIN) was assigned to the template and stored in memory.
All subjects were enrolled into the 7.5 system prior to the
next phase of the experiment.
As previously stated, the Eye Dentify 7.5 is capable of
operating at thresholds specified by the system operator.
Utilization of thresholds of +.60, +.72 and +.85 were
expressly chosen for the design of this experiment. This
represents the low medium " and high ranges allowed by the
system. Each subject attempted to gain access (be
recognized) over each of the three thresholds. At each
testing session a total of six trials were recorded for each
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subject. A trial is the attempted access at one particular
threshold by a subject. After each trial the threshold
level was changed. The order of threshold testing was
randomly assigned to each subject. When a trial at each
threshold was completed the process was executed a second
time and the session ended.
A subject was required to wait at least one hour between
sessions. This, as well as the order of threshold testing,
was embedded into the experimental design to negate the
possible effects associated with the learning curve known to
be related to the 7.5 system. As the subject becomes more
familiar with the equipment, the better he is able to focus
on the daisy and properly align his eye with the ICAM. This
results in a more accurate scan.
The recognition mode was used throughout the experiment.
Subjects were not required to do more than request access by
focusing their view on the daisy wheel and activating the
scan mechanism. If the verify mode were used the subject
would have been required to input their pin before the scan
process. A printer was connected to the 7.5 system which
would simulate the use of a security log and record the
results of each access attempt. For any one trial a subject
who was not recognized would be instructed by the system to
repeat the attempt and "not recognized" would be annotated
on the printout. Three consecutive non-recognitions by one
subject resulted in the subject being instructed to "see
security" and similar output was displayed on the printer.
Subjects receiving three consecutive non recognitions were
considered to have been denied access for that particular
trial
.
A record was kept which documented the subject, trial
number, and threshold during each session. Annotations were
made indicating whether a subject was recognized on the
first
,





The data collected on the recognition rate of the 7.5
system were expected to be binomial in nature (Winer, 1971).
In order to stabilize the variances, the data was
transformed using the arcsin transformation, y ' =2arcsin ~i y .
A level of significance, c< , of .05 was selected during the
design phase.
Records of observations were tabulated, specifying for
each subject the percentage of recognitions out of a
possible twelve at each threshold. The recognition rate for
all subjects at each threshold are shown in Table I.
A two way factorial analysis of variance was performed
on the transformed data. The Results are summarized in
Table II. The analysis showed the effect of threshold
levels to be significant (F = 39.02, df = 2/50, p < .0005).
A range test on means (Hicks, 1973) was performed to
determine which threshold levels were significantly
different. It was concluded that at the oc = .05 level there
were significant differences between the .60 and .85
thresholds and between the .72 and .85 thresholds. No
significant difference was found between the .60 and the .72
levels
.
Figure 3.2 shows the overall recognition rates over all
three thresholds. As can readily be seen, there is a marked


























ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE 7.5 SYSTEM RECOGNITION RATE
SOURCE DF SS MS Significance
Subjects 25 16,,617 0.665 .132
Threshold 2 10,.066 5.033 39.020
Error 50 06,.425 0.129
Total 77 33.108
** P < .0005
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Figure 3.3 plots the recognition rate for each attempt
over the three thresholds. For the trials as a whole, at the
.60 level, 84% were recognized on the first attempt, 9% were
recognized on the second attempt, 2% on the third attempt
and 5% were not recognized at all. Yet as Figure 3.4
illustrates, at the .60 threshold, 55% of those
remaining( 16%) who were not recognized on the first attempt
were recognized on the second; of the 7% remaining subjects
who were not recognized on either the first or second
attempt, 33% were admitted on the 3rd attempt. When
subjects were not recognized on the first attempt, 31% of
those remaining were not recognized at all at the .60 level,
28% at the .72, and 53% were not recognized at the 85%
















Figure 3.2 Overall Recognition Rate.
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IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A. DISCUSSIONS
1. Type I and Type II Error Rate
As previously suggested in the discussion about the
recognition rates, type I error rates were found to be 5% at
.60, 8% at .72 and 31% at the .85 correlation threshold. In
the approximately 6,000-7,000 scans that were taken, in a
pilot experiment, practice and during the actual experiment,
there were zero misrecognitions (see Table III).
TABLE III





Evidence from this experiment indicates there is no
reason to suggest that the calculations for the probability
for type II errors determined by the Oregon study are
incorrect. Eye Dentify, Inc. advertised a 1% type I error
rate yet no formal experiment was published which indicates
that this probability was tested.
One factor which seems to have had a significant
impact on the type I error rate was the enrollment process.
During enrollment, one of the subjects was unable to achieve
the goal which, as previously stated, was to average four
templates with the reference, each with a correlation score
no lower than +.90. After numerous scans the subject could
only achieve two scores which correlated high enough to be
averaged with the reference. Subsequently, she had
difficulty being recognized by the system. When her
experiment data is ignored, the overall type I error rate
drops to 2% at .60, 5% at .72 and 29% at .85 correlation. In
addition, when this subject was re-enrolled at the
conclusion of the experiment, five "good" templates were
achieved and averaged. She then attempted to gain access
and was consistently recognized by the 7.5 system at all
three thresholds.
The results of a pilot experiment further support
this theory. In the pilot test, subjects were enrolled by
averaging the first five scans with the reference template
regardless of their correlation scores. As a result, type I
errors were significantly higher (16% at .60, 26% at .72 and
49% at .85). Figure 4.1 illustrates the comparison of the
pilot test data with the experimental data after adjustment
for the poor enrollee. As can be seen, the pilot test
scores are 84% recognized at the .60 threshold, 74% at .72
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Figure 4.1 Pilot Test Results vs Adjusted Experimental Data
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Another noteworthy observation deals with the use of
contacts or glasses. Neither had any effect on the
recognition rate of the system. Those with glasses were
instructed to remove them prior to enrollment or access
request. Those wearing soft or hard contact lens attempted
to gain access without them at various times throughout the
experiment. No difference in recognition ability was
noticed
.
2. Other Measures of Effectiveness
a. Susceptibility to Circumvention
As previously stated, the microprocessor and
subassemblies are located in a cast aluminum housing.
Access to the processor and printed circuit boards is
through the back of the machine via a key lock. If it is
mounted onto a wall, all connecting wires would be through
the wall. Anyone attempting to bypass or intercept
transmissions would have to dismount the device.
b. Time to Achieve Recognition
This experiment was not designed to precisely
estimate the time to recognition. However, through
observations it was estimated that it took 2-3 seconds from
the time the scan button was activated to acceptance and 5-7
seconds if rejected by the system. Added to this must be
the time it took to fixate on the daisy wheel as well as the
time for each subsequent attempt before recognition.
c. Convenience to the User
This system is very easy to use in many ways.
When the recognition mode is used, the individual need not
remember any passwords or numbers. Learning to use the
device is quite simple. All the individual needs to do is
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concentrate on a fixation point and activate the SCAN
button. Sometimes, however, it is difficult to focus
properly on this point. Frustration increasingly becomes a
factor when additional attempts are necessary. It was
observed through the experiment that the enrollment process
proved to be more time consuming and frustrating than had
been anticipated. Of the 32 subjects who were enrolled, 24
required 10 or more SCANS to acquire five templates
correlating +.90 or better with the reference. 11 of those
24 required in excess of 20 SCANS to accomplish that goal.
d. Computer System Processing Requirements
The Eye Dentify 7.5 System is designed primarily
as a physical access device only. Additional software is
available (purchased separately) which makes interface with
a computer system possible. However, in order for this
system to be used for access to systems and applications
programs, additional software must be written. This would
require processing capability and storage at the central
facility as the microprocessor is incapable of doing this.
In addition, if the system were to be used at a large
facility which has more than 1200 individuals requiring
access, additional space would be needed from the central
computer to store those reference templates.
e. Reliability and Maintainability
The 7.5 system performs consistently and is
fairly maintenance- free . The software has proven reliable
and hardware components such as printed circuit boards and
subassemblies can be easily replaced when failure occurs.
f. Cost of the System
The purchase price of this retina scan device is
$10K. The proms required for computer system interface cost
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approximately $500. The amount of money that would be
required to develop the software to support this interface
would depend on its applications. The applications programs
would be unique to the system utilized and a price cannot be
quoted without a feasibility study. Nevertheless, these
costs must be considered when determining the cost of the
system.
B. CONCLUSIONS
The Eye Dentify 7.5 system is a fairly expensive, highly
reliable access control device. Its probability for false
recognitions is far better than most other known devices.
It can be used as a physical access device at virtually any
military installation where access devices are used. The
larger the installation, the more consideration must be
given to its time to recognition. If a large queue forms
for those awaiting admission, methods may be invented by
authorized users to circumvent the system altogether,
thereby negating the purpose of the system. The best
applications for this in the military environment" seems to
be at small installations where time is not a significant
factor yet denial of access to unauthorized users is vital
to security.
As a device for access to computer systems and
applications programs, the 7.5 system is not yet ready to
replace passwords. The price of the equipment plus the
expense necessary for the development of associated software
make it cost prohibitive for most computer systems. Final
determination, however, lies in the hands of the potential
buyer. For some systems this may be a small price to pay
for the assurance of a one in a million chance for intrusion
by a would be perpetrator. The information to be protected
may be so sensitive that management is willing to pay the
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costs as well as endure the frustration of authorized users
who encounter false rejections (type II errors).
C. FURTHER RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS
The Eye Dentify 7.5 system is still relatively new to
the marketplace. Very little research regarding this system
has been published. The following represents just some of
the areas in which this system could be tested.
1. Test the effect of enrollment upon type I error
rates. When authorized users are consistantly
rejected, can re-enrollment reduce the error rate?
2. Test this equipment on a moving platform Is it
feasible to apply this access control device to
shipboard applications?
3. Develop the necessary software and test the possible
applications when interfacing with a central host or
distributed computer system.
4. What effects do different lighting conditions have on
the reliability of the system?
5. What are the type I and type II error rates when two
eyes are used as a reference rather than one eye?
6. What are the effects of electromagnetic pulse on the
system?
7. Design an experiment to accurately determine the
average time to recognition for the 7.5 device.
8. What are the type I and type II error rates for the
7.5 system when the verification mode is used instead
of the recognition mode? (Maxwell)
9
.
What happens to the system when the number of
reference templates in memory approaches or exceeds
1200?
10. Conduct this same experiment over a wide range of age
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